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May 1, 2010American Economic Review

Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

Benjamin Edelman Michael Schwarz

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Abstract

Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions by Benjamin Edelman and Michael Schwarz. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 597-602 of American Economic Review, May 2010

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Edelman et al. (2010) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a1bee1600ee29383e9d29de https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.597

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