Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War

Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War Francesco Giumelli Colchester : ECPR Press ( 2011 ), 226 p ., ISBN 978-1-907-30120-9 Sanctions in their various forms are among the most widely used tools in foreign policy. Therefore, it is essential that their manifestations and determinates be properly understood. The monograph argues that the study of sanctions is hampered by inadequate taxonomies, which focus on the targeted sector (embargos, financial, asset freezes) but say little about the sanctions’ logic and intent thus contributing to the “lack of generally accepted concepts … held together by loose assumptions based on empirical evaluations” (p. 19). In result, researchers are unable to get a clear notion of how to go about determining the success of sanctions, which is among the most consequential issues in international politics and subject to much debate in the literature (some well-known examples include Galtung 1967; Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997). The author’s suggested remedy involves the definition of a different taxonomy of sanctions, which “puts them back in the foreign policy toolbox” by focusing on the motivation behind their imposition. The manuscript makes several contributions to the sanctions debate. By defining each episode as one of coercing, constraining, or signalling, we get a better sense of the dichotomous logic at play between a ‘sender’ and a ‘target’ and could move beyond descriptive categorizations and towards formulating theories of the structural conditions behind sanctions’ imposition. Also, by clearly stating what sanctions are (“politically-motivated penalties imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or international obligations”, p.16), the author is able to distinguish them from other foreign-policy means to redress infringement, such as reprisals. From the definition, we get a sense of sanctions’ normative import, the binary relationship they establish (‘sender’–‘target’), and their embeddedness within the international system. The new analytical taxonomy of sanctions is elaborated in Chapters 2–3. The monograph proceeds by developing a theory of the combination of structural factors accounting for the observed distribution of sanctions by type (Chapters 4–5) and testing the framework empirically through detailed case studies (Chapters 6–7). The monograph also includes an appendix of sanctions episodes spanning over two decades and covering seventy cases in total. It thus contributes conceptually, methodologically, and empirically to debates regarding sanctions’ determinates and success, which is a considerable feat. Conceptually, the approach re-focuses attention from the description of sanctions to the act of sanctioning allowing for a more theoretically-useful vocabulary for capturing what sanctions do. Vying to place the use of sanctions back into the ‘foreign policy tool-box’, the typology does just that by distinguishing between coercing, constraining, and signalling as the professed intent of sanctions’ senders. Seeing beyond the sanctions’ targeted sector and focusing on their function thus becomes possible and episodes are re-grouped in novel ways according to the three categories. It also establishes a base-line for judging sanctions’ effectiveness, which has somewhat eluded much earlier work. Thus, sanctions need only be judged by referring to their own stated objective, which in most cases is rather limited (54% of the sample lists signalling as the sanctions’ explicit goal, p. 53). Empirically, the research gives a sense of the distribution of sanctions’ episodes by logic (illustrated on pages 53–70). The latter provides many avenues for rigorous comparative work. It does, however, beg the question of how exclusive the three categories are, or is it possible that some combination of coercing, constraining, or signalling can be the explicit intent of senders? Empirically, this seems to be the case; at the very least, signalling can be seen as being implicit in the other two types. A hierarchy of sanctions thus seems an appropriate structure to reflect this dynamic with signalling as the basis for most decisions to impose sanctions. This logic is implicit in the formulation of the hypotheses in Chapter 5 where coercing seems to be driven by more urgency and potential threat. It would hence be easily accommodated in the existing framework. The first few chapters of the monograph thus set the stage for formulating theories and testing hypotheses accounting for the observed variation in the logic behind sanctioning. Having defined the dependent variable (sanctions episodes) and its distribution, the author proceeds with examining the systemic conditions determining the types of sanctions imposed. These are defined as ‘threat’, ‘salience’, and ‘dispute complexity’ and measured according to indices of scale. The framework allows for the definition of hypotheses regarding the combination of dependent variables, which would determine the logic of sanctions imposition. The process of inductively deriving these hypotheses by first, situating the types of sanctions within the wider literature of foreign policy tools and second, applying concepts developed within the latter to conceive of the motivations actors have in imposing sanctions contributes to the model’s internal validity. There is a clear line of reasoning, which can be traced from the structural environment, through actors’ evaluations of this environment, to the choice of tools available for responding to crises at hand, to the nature of observed responses. In other words, the framework successfully unifies theory with measurement. This is important in a field characterized by numerous descriptive taxonomies and arguments testing various logics not necessarily related to these taxonomies. Perhaps the biggest potential for improvement lies in relaxing the unitary sender assumption underlying the hypotheses presented by the monograph. Understanding the complexity of senders’ evaluations of the situation, preferred remedy, and geo-political concerns could go a long way to accounting for the 30% of cases not explained by the suggested framework. Political will is shown to matter in the imposition of unilateral sanctions (McGillivray and Stam 2004) and the complexity of decision-making of International Organizations needs to be taken into account when the latter are considered as senders. Bringing in the complexity behind the decision to sanction could provide an alternative account to the normative compliance view of signalling inherent in the theory. It could explain why sanctions are not imposed despite a clear presence of threat or why they are imposed when there is no direct threat to the sender(s). The reliance on the senders’ assessment of (material) threat for the decision to impose sanctions on the one hand, and classifying the type of sanction as signalling for normative concerns creates a tension within the theory, which needs to be resolved. Are sanctions imposed to counter threats or to ensure normative compliance? If both, under what conditions would one consideration trump the other? These questions suggest ways to expand the theoretical framework of the study. Empirically, the obvious avenue for further research involves examining cases when sanctions were not imposed to provide validity for the models presented and open possibilities for examining further questions the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool.