Donor aid, institutional quality, and economic governance in post-conflict African states: comparative evidence from Somalia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone

This paper examines why comparable levels of donor aid produce different outcomes in economic governance and public financial management across post-conflict African states. Focusing on Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, it addresses a key puzzle in development economics: why countries with high aid dependence and similar reconstruction goals follow different governance trajectories. Drawing on World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, IMF reports, and OECD-DAC aid statistics, the study develops the Donor–Institutional Alignment Model (DIAM). The model explains how state capacity, political ownership, and coordination coherence shape the translation of aid into governance outcomes. Using a qualitative comparative analytical approach, the paper finds that Rwanda’s stronger donor–institutional alignment supported budget reliability, fiscal credibility, and regulatory predictability. Sierra Leone shows partial and uneven alignment, while Somalia remains constrained by fragmented institutions, parallel aid systems, and weak fiscal consolidation. The findings suggest that aid effectiveness depends less on aid volume than on the quality of institutional alignment. The study contributes to aid-effectiveness debates by explaining divergent post-conflict economic governance outcomes and offering policy-relevant lessons for fragile settings.