Environmental learning, metaphors and natural capital1

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes A first draft of this paper was produced for the second seminar of the Economic and Social Research Council Environment and Human Behaviour New Opportunities Programme project, 'Natural Capital: Metaphor, Learning and Human Behaviour', which was held in Bath in June 2003. I would like to thank the participants—especially Alan Reid who was discussant for the paper—for their constructive comments. I would also like to thank Bill Scott, Stephen Gough, John Foster and Robin Grove‐White for inviting me to participate in the seminar, and especially Stephen Gough and John Foster, for providing the stimulus of the 'real options' metaphor. I use this expression rather than the more common idea of 'pro‐environmental behaviour' because it is often assumed (wrongly) that we know what the latter means (Gough, 2002 Gough, S. (2002a). Whose gap? Whose mind? Plural rationalities and disappearing academics. Environmental Education Research, 8(1): 273–281. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]a, p.274). This moment of environmental sense‐making is emphasised by the 'quantitative tradition' of educational thinking, which 'sees learning as a process of accumulation of knowledge' (Scott & Gough, 2003 Scott W Gough S (2003) Sustainable development and learning: framing the issues London RoutledgeFalmer [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 91). The much better known 'attitude‐behaviour gap' might plausibly be understood as a combination of these two gaps (Kolmuss & Agyeman, 2002 Kolmuss, A and Agyeman, J. (2002). Mind the gap: why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro‐environmental behavior?. Environmental Education Research, 8(3): 239–260. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]; Bell, 2003 Bell D (2003) Policy, participation and the 'social gap' in windfarm siting decisions unpublished working paper for ESRC Environment and Human Behaviour New Opportunities Programme project, 'Tilting at Windmills: the attitude behaviour gap in renewable energy conflicts' [Google Scholar]). The expression of an 'attitude'—as typically measured by response to a survey question—might be a judgement about how the interviewee believes he/we should respond to a particular environmental issue more often than it is an indication of what he is motivated to do. Carlsson and Jensen (2004 Carlsson M Jensen B (2004) Encouraging environmental citizenship: the roles and challenges for schools unpublished paper [Google Scholar], p. 2) make an important distinction between 'action' and 'behaviour'—and between 'behaviour modification' and 'action competence'—which my use here may seem to ignore. On their account, '[before] an action, there will always be a conscious making up of one's mind, while this is not necessarily the case with a behavioural change' (p. 2). For them, an 'action' is autonomous whereas 'behaviour' may be heteronomous. I have three problems with this distinction. First, at each moment of sense‐making and action there may be a separate question about the individual's (or the institution's) autonomy—any change at each moment might be either autonomous or heteronomous. Second, our understanding of autonomy and heteronomy may well be different at each of the five moments. Third, autonomy and heteronomy—and action and behaviour—might be better understood as existing on a continuum rather than as a simple opposition. On the deficit model see, for example, Kolmuss and Agyeman (2002 Kolmuss, A and Agyeman, J. (2002). Mind the gap: why do people act environmentally and what are the barriers to pro‐environmental behavior?. Environmental Education Research, 8(3): 239–260. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], p. 241) and Irwin (1995 Irwin A (1995) Citizen science: a study of people, expertise and sustainable development London Routledge [Google Scholar], pp. 13–14). For an account of the origins of the 'greenhouse' metaphor (going back to 1824) see Brown (2003 Brown T (2003) Making truth: metaphor in science Urbana IL University of Illinois Press [Google Scholar], pp. 167–168). Brown (2003 Brown T (2003) Making truth: metaphor in science Urbana IL University of Illinois Press [Google Scholar], p. 169) argues that the 'greenhouse' metaphor has provided a conceptual framework for most subsequent thinking in this area. In other words, the metaphor is not purely didactic but also a 'conceptual metaphor' (Brown, 2003 Brown T (2003) Making truth: metaphor in science Urbana IL University of Illinois Press [Google Scholar], p. 32). I discuss the role of metaphors in our conceptual schemes in the text below. For an account of some of the peculiarities and complexities of the 'greenhouse' metaphor, see Myerson and Rydin (1996 Myerson G Rydin Y (1996) The language of environment: a new rhetoric London UCL Press [Google Scholar], pp. 150–151). Of course, it isn't really 'just as'. The 'greenhouse' is a metaphor not a literal description. For critical discussion see Denham (2000 Denham A (2000) Metaphor and moral experience Oxford Clarendon Press [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], pp. 232–242). See also Beardsley (1981 Beardsley M (1981) The metaphorical twist in: M. Johnson (Ed.) Philosophical perspectives on metaphor Minneapolis MN University of Minnesota Press 105 122 [Google Scholar], p. 117) on 'dead metaphors'. On the general role of metaphor in science, see especially Brown (2003 Brown T (2003) Making truth: metaphor in science Urbana IL University of Illinois Press [Google Scholar]) and Kuhn (1979 Kuhn T (1979) Metaphor in science in: A. Ortony (Ed.) Metaphor in thought Cambridge Cambridge University Press 409 419 [Google Scholar]). On metaphor in environmental discourse, see especially Philippon (2004 Philippon D (2004) Conserving words: how American nature writers shaped the environmental movement Athens GA University of Georgia Press [Google Scholar]) and Myerson and Rydin (1996 Myerson G Rydin Y (1996) The language of environment: a new rhetoric London UCL Press [Google Scholar]). The notation used follows Lakoff and Johnson (1980 Lakoff G Johnson M (1980) Metaphors we live by Chicago IL University of Chicago Press [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). The writers are Theodore Roosevelt, Mabel Osgood Wright, John Muir, Aldo Leopold and Edward Abbey. On the debate between Pearce and the ecological economists, notably Daly and Costanza, over what is involved in valuing the environment, see Åkerman (2003 Åkerman M (2003) What does 'natural capital' do?—the role of metaphor in economic understanding of the environment paper presented to ESRC seminar, 'Natural Capital: Metaphor, Learning and Human Behaviour' Lancaster 15 April. Available online at: www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/naturalcapital/(accessed 10 October 2004) [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Of course, when natural capital is integrated with man‐made capital in 'weak sustainability' theories the implications for nature of the 'constant capital' requirement become much less clear (Pearce, 1994 Pearce D (Ed.) (1994) Blueprint 2: greening the world economy London Earthscan [Google Scholar], pp. 1–3; Åkerman, 2003 Åkerman M (2003) What does 'natural capital' do?—the role of metaphor in economic understanding of the environment paper presented to ESRC seminar, 'Natural Capital: Metaphor, Learning and Human Behaviour' Lancaster 15 April. Available online at: www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/naturalcapital/(accessed 10 October 2004) [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 'The value of this [capital] stock at any time t is taken to be the net present value of the total flow of benefits as at t—that is, the value of the benefits actually flowing from the stock at t, plus the value (appropriately discounted) ascribed at t to the benefits which it is expected to provide in the future, less the corresponding values of any present or future costs associated with maintaining the stock in being [i.e. the costs of not liquidating the capital]' (Gough, 2003 Gough S (2003) Rethinking the natural capital metaphor: implications for education and learning unpublished working paper for ESRC project, 'Natural Capital: Metaphor, Learning and Human Behaviour. Available online at: www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/naturalcapital/(accessed 10 October 2004) [Google Scholar], p. 4). New inventions create new opportunities for valuing and, therefore, new values (Foster, 1997 Foster J (1997) Environment and creative value in: J. Foster (Ed.) Valuing nature? Ethics, economics and the environment London Routledge 119 134 [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 2003 Foster J (2003c) Rethinking the natural capital metaphor: implications for sustainability planning and decision‐making unpublished working paper for ESRC project, 'Natural Capital: Metaphor, Learning and Human Behaviour'. Available online at: www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/naturalcapital/(accessed 10 October 2004) [Google Scholar]c, p. 5). Compare Gough's claim that natural capital is 'a state attributed to aspects of nature by humans. It is not intrinsic to such aspects of nature' (2003, p. 11). Gough's overall account of environmental learning integrates the programme here and Foster's programme of learning (see text below). On the role of deliberative democracy given a conception of the environment as 'a subject about which there is disagreement', see Bell (2004 Bell D (2004) Liberal environmental citizenship paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Research Sessions April [Google Scholar]). On the nature of deliberative democracy more generally see Thompson and Bell (2004 Thompson N Bell D (2004) The deliberative fix? The role of staged deliberation in a deliberative democracy paper presented at Political Studies Association Annual Conference April [Google Scholar]). Additional informationNotes on contributorsDerek R. Bell ** School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK. Email: derek.bell@ncl.ac.uk * School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK. Email: derek.bell@ncl.ac.uk