Abstract: Indian strategists have traditionally prioritised the role of the Indian Army in countering China and attempting to narrow the capability gap along the northern frontier. However, the prolonged post-Galwan border crisis since 2020 has catalysed alternative approaches that emphasise counterbalancing China’s continental advantage through increasing maritime deterrence. This article argues that India has begun to overhaul its conventional approach that has long been dominated by a land-centric buildup. Instead, India has sought to better leverage its advantages in the Indian Ocean to strengthen deterrence against both Chinese naval forces and merchant shipping and aim to gain additional bargaining leverage in its continental rivalry with China. Thus, as this strategy, dubbed “offsetting China’s continental advantage through maritime deterrence” (hereafter, maritime deterrence in short), highlights the expansion of the theatre of Sino–Indian rivalry beyond the land to include the maritime domain, it calls for greater investment in the Indian Navy. More importantly, it reflects India’s emerging effort to integrate the continental and maritime theatres within a more coherent strategic framework. In this sense, maritime deterrence is not merely a programme of naval modernisation, but part of a broader endeavour to recalibrate India’s overall strategic posture and secure asymmetric advantages vis-à-vis China.
Renjie et al. (Fri,) studied this question.