What does this research mean for the field?

Things do not possess essences as properties, but rather are fundamentally constituted by their essences, a view that avoids the ontological regresses inherent in Modal and Definitional Essentialism. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.CONTRADICTORY. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.CHALLENGES_CONSENSUS.

What question did this study set out to answer?

This paper challenges traditional views of modal and definitional essentialism in relation to identity and essence.

June 1, 2026The Monist0 citations

x Is Essentially F

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AMAnna Marmodoro

Key Points

This paper challenges traditional views of modal and definitional essentialism in relation to identity and essence.
Critical analysis of modal essentialism and definitional essentialism
Examination of ontological implications of regresses
Argument development for an alternative essentialism
Traditional essentialism leads to problematic regresses in ontology.
Proposes a framework where essences constitute entities rather than being properties of them.

Abstract

Abstract In this paper I argue against the view that essences are related to the things that have them as properties those things cannot lose without losing their identity. If things have their essences, regresses develop and unravel the ontology. Both Modal Essentialism and Kit Fine’s Definitional Essentialism are open to such regresses. By contrast, I advocate a type of essentialism according to which things do not have essences and are not qualified by their essences, but rather, they are constituted by their essences.

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x Is Essentially F

Key Points

Abstract

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