Why the study?
Outbreaks of cVDPV2 persist after OPV2 cessation, and trade-offs of delaying outbreak response to avoid mOPV2 while waiting for nOPV2 were uncertain.
Does delaying outbreak response to wait for nOPV2 increase the expected burden of cVDPV2 cases compared to immediate response with mOPV2?
Does delaying outbreak response to wait for nOPV2 increase the expected burden of cVDPV2 cases compared to immediate response with mOPV2?
Delaying polio outbreak response to wait for a novel vaccine significantly increases the expected number of cases and the risk of needing to restart widespread OPV2 use, highlighting the need for immediate response with available vaccines.
May support immediate mOPV2 response over delay for nOPV2; modeling leaves open need for prospective validation in eradication programs.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) faces substantial challenges with managing outbreaks of serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV2s) in 2021. A full five years after the globally coordinated removal of serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV2) from trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV) for use in national immunization programs, cVDPV2s did not die out. Since OPV2 cessation, responses to outbreaks caused by cVDPV2s mainly used serotype 2 monovalent OPV (mOPV2) from a stockpile. A novel vaccine developed from a genetically stabilized OPV2 strain (nOPV2) promises to potentially facilitate outbreak response with lower prospective risks, although its availability and properties in the field remain uncertain. Using an established global poliovirus transmission model and building on a related analysis that characterized the impacts of disruptions in GPEI activities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore the implications of trade-offs associated with delaying outbreak response to avoid using mOPV2 by waiting for nOPV2 availability (or equivalently, delayed responses waiting for national validation of meeting the criteria for nOPV2 initial use). Consistent with prior modeling, responding as quickly as possible with available mOPV2 promises to reduce the expected burden of disease in the outbreak population and to reduce the chances for the outbreak virus to spread to other areas. Delaying cVDPV2 outbreak response (e.g., modeled as no response January-June 2021) to wait for nOPV2 can considerably increase the total expected cases (e.g., by as many as 1,300 cVDPV2 cases in the African region during 2021-2023) and increases the likelihood of triggering the need to restart widescale preventive use of an OPV2-containing vaccine in national immunization programs that use OPV. Countries should respond to any cVDPV2 outbreaks quickly with rounds that achieve high coverage using any available OPV2, and plan to use nOPV2, if needed, once it becomes widely available based on evidence that it is as effective but safer in populations than mOPV2.
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Kalkowska et al. (2021) studied this question.
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