Constructing Expertise

There is much with which to agree in the discussion paper of Collins & Evans (2002) on a 'normative theory of expertise' as the next step in science studies, but also much with which to disagree.While I have a problem with their various rhetorical strategies, 1 I strongly agree with Collins and Evans that a normative theory of expertise is an important challenge for science studies at the present time (2002: 237, 239). 2 However, I found their paper curiously disappointing in how they address that challenge.There are three items in their paper that qualify for a normative theory, or the beginnings of such a theory.First, Collins and Evans emphasize that there is expertise, often 'experience-based', which is not recognized by certification (2002: 238). 3They do not follow-up on how one can recognize such expertise, and recognize it at an early stage, perhaps as a competence.Although this may well be impossible, one might be able to improve the processes of recognition.Second, they emphasize that more 'extension', i.e. more participation by non-specialists, is not always better.This point deserves to be reiterated, and further articulation is important.Collins and Evans appear to suggest that the actual, 'optimal', extension is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.At least, that is the way they discuss their cases (2002: 261-65).Third, they emphasize that one can usefully start with esoteric sciences as a model, and with the experience of the sociologist studying such sciences as a heuristic.That this is indeed part of a normative theory is visible in phrases such as: It seems, then, important to retain a notion, even if it is an idealized one, of a core-set community in which expertise is used to adjudicate between competing knowledge-claims and to determine the content of knowledge.