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This article examines the determinants of the positioning of secondary states in the US-China conflict over market access for China’s Huawei. Our explanations draw on three branches of realism: balance-of-threat theory, patron-client theory, and Hirschman’s theory on trade relationships and foreign-policy convergence. For the dependent variable, we assemble a new dataset of the attitudes of 70 states toward Huawei’s investment aspirations. We present a series of ordered logit regression models from which three main patterns appear. First, less powerful states seem more acceptive of the Chinese company. Second, those states that rely on US security guarantees tend to be far more rejective of Huawei. Third, whereas trade with China appears to be a factor in the reasonings of other states, trade with the US is not. In sum, the patron-client theory offers the most cogent explanation of the divergence of responses to Huawei.
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Christie et al. (2023) studied this question.
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