Deterrence Measures and the Preservation of Asylum in the United Kingdom and United States

This paper examines the concept of ‘deterrence’ in relation to states' policies towards asylum seekers and refugees. States ostensibly use deterrence measures, such as detention or the withdrawal of welfare benefits, in an effort to preserve asylum for the benefit of the ‘bona fide’ refugee. That is, asylum can only be maintained if the abusers of the system are removed from the equation. The author argues that it cannot be possible for states to pre-determine who is a ‘genuine’ refugee, and states such as the UK and US use deterrence policies, not to cater to refugees' interests, but to serve their own. It is argued that states implement deterrence measures to reduce the numbers of applicants for asylum overall, regardless of their validity; to save money; to criminalize aliens and discourage permanent settlement; and to conciliate certain sectors of the public and reassert state legitimacy. The author reviews the costs of such policies and suggests five possible alternatives to these highly contentious measures.