The minimum force debate: contemporary sensibilities meet imperial practice

No aspect of British counter-insurgency has been more problematic and controversial than the doctrine of minimum force. This common law principle provided ambiguous guidance for soldiers and police quelling unrest within a global empire and has become the subject of intense scholarly debate in the post-imperial era. The argument divides academics into two broad camps. One group sees minimum force as a vital element of a largely successful, uniquely British approach to counter-insurgency. The other claims that the legal principle never really restrained British security forces and considers the British approach to counter-insurgency neither unique nor particularly successful. This debate appeared in an exchange of views between John Newsinger and the current author in a 1990 volume of Small Wars and Insurgencies and more recently in a similar but lengthier argument between Rod Thornton and Huw Bennett in the same journal between 2007 and 2010.1 1. Newsinger, ‘Minimum Force’; Mockaitis Mockaitis, Thomas R. Autumn 1992. Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion: A Reply. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 3(2): 87–9. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], ‘Minimum Force: A Reply’; Bennett, ‘The Other Side of COIN’; Thornton Thornton, Rod. March 2009. Minimum Force: A Reply to Hew Bennett. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20(1): 215–26. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], ‘Minimum Force: A Reply to Hew Bennett’; Bennett, ‘Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency’. Such disagreements are of course endemic to academic discourse. This one, however, seems to be about more than history.