Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique

Normative political philosoph y always refers to a standard against which a society's institution s are judged. In the first, analytical part of the article, the different possible forms of normative criticism are examined accordin g to whether the standards it appeals to are external or internal to the society in question. In the tradition of Socrates and Hegel, it is argued that reconstructin g the kind of norms that are implicit in practices enables a critique that does not force the critic's particula r views on the addressee and can also be motivationall y effective. In the second part of the article, Axel Honneth's theory of recognitio n is examined as a form of such reconstructiv e internal critique. It is argued that while the implicit norms of recognitio n made explicit in Honneth's philosophica l anthropolog y help explain progressiv e social struggles as moral ones, his theory faces two challenge s in justifying internal critique. The Priority Challenge asks for the reasons why the implicit norms of recognition should be taken as the standard against which other implicit and explicit norms are to be judged. The Application Challenge asks why a social group should, by its own lights, extend equal recognitio n to all its members and even non-members. The kind of functional , prudential, conceptual , and moral consideration s that could serve to answer these challenge s are sketched.