A substantive theory of the relative efficiency of environmental treaty compliance strategies: The case of cites

To date, there has been no effort to analyze systematically the reasons for noncom‐pliance with The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the various strategics available to address those shortcomings. This article reports on a study which proposes a substantive theory of the relative efficiency of environmental treaty compliance strategies in the CITES context. In brief, the theory suggests that countries will comply more fully with their treaty obligations if the costs of compliance are reduced, and certain strategies are more efficient in reducing these costs than others. The costs and benefits of various strategies, applicable to both the target and the initiator of the strategy, are detailed. Hypotheses about the relative efficiency of the strategies and corollaries relating to the selection of target countries and the appropriateness of certain strategies for treaty parties are also described.