Experience, Expertise, and Strategic Diversification: How Professional Background Shapes Legislative Behavior in China's National People's Congress

The study tests the functional co-optation theory and reputation-boost theory against different delegate types in Chinese National People's Congress, analyzing an original dataset of 622 delegates who sponsored at least one bill in the 13th NPC (2018-2022) and their 2,209 sponsored bills. Building on content analysis and logistic models, I find that functional delegates increasingly sponsor professionally congruent bills as they gain seniority (supporting the co-optation theory), while non-functional delegates, particularly CEOs, increasingly diversify beyond their professional domains as they gain seniority (supporting the reputation-boost theory). These divergent patterns remain robust when controlling for demographic factors, with female government executives uniquely sponsoring professionally congruent bills addressing women's interests, while ethnic minorities in non-functional roles demonstrate lower professional congruence than their Han counterparts. These findings reveal authoritarian legislatures as complex arenas where delegates leverage professional expertise, political considerations, and demographic representation to maximize their policy influence. To the best of my knowledge, this article is the first to link professional backgrounds to bill subject matter in an authoritarian setting, offering insights into delegate behavior in the absence of electoral accountability.