Signaling Sophistication: How Social Expectations Can Increase Political Information Acquisition

Information plays an integral role in theories of political behavior. However, little is known about why—if ever—voters choose to acquire political information. This article proposes that voters strategically acquire costly political information to cultivate a reputation among their peers as politically sophisticated. I test this theory in Mexico using experimental and observational research designs that exogenously vary the likelihood that individuals’ peers observe the political knowledge they possess. The results demonstrate that social incentives significantly increase political knowledge among voters nested within groups that collectively value political knowledge. Consistent with the model, I find that relatively unsophisticated voters seek to reach a minimum standard within their social group, while more sophisticated voters acquire higher levels of information to differentiate themselves from less informed peers. These findings indicate that social networks can increase informed participation in a major nonconsolidated democracy, but they also highlight how politically disengaged networks can generate information traps.