Government governance, executive networks and corporate investment efficiency

Purpose Owing to the importance of the investment behavior in China, the purpose of this paper is to find the influence of executive network and government governance on investment efficiency. Design/methodology/approach The paper use China’s listed companies as sample to make an investment efficiency determinant model. Findings In this article, the authors find that larger executive network and higher government governance will lead to more corporate investment efficient. Furthermore, the informal institution – executive network, is not only an effective way to alleviate financing constraints, but also can solve underinvestment problem. While the improvement of local government governance can provide institutional protection, it will also be more conducive to restrain overinvestment behavior. Research limitations/implications The authors have not explored conduction path. Especially, the authors have not examined whether information spillover effect or the release of resources constraints in executive network plays a more important role to ease investment insufficient. Originality/value Under the Chinese circumstance, relationship governance can not only promote companies to improve investment efficiency, but also provide an important guarantee for sustained macroeconomic growth.