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Empirical analysis reveals utility loss and potential gains from commitment mechanisms in welfare programs.
We empirically implement a dynamic structural model of labor supply and welfare program participation for agents with potentially time‐inconsistent preferences. Using panel data on the choices of single women with children from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY) 1979, we provide estimates of the degree of time‐inconsistency, and of its influence on the welfare take‐up decision. With these estimates, we conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify a measure of the utility loss stemming from the inability to commit to future decisions, and the potential gains from commitment mechanisms such as welfare time limits and work requirements.
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Fang et al. (2009) studied this question.
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