An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?

This article analyzes the 205 death‐eligible murders leading to homicide convictions in C onnecticut from 1973–2007 to determine if discriminatory and arbitrary factors influenced capital outcomes. A regression analysis controlling for an array of legitimate factors relevant to the crime, defendant, and victim provides overwhelming evidence that minority defendants who kill white victims are capitally charged at substantially higher rates than minority defendants who kill minorities, that geography influences both capital charging and sentencing decisions (with the location of a crime in Waterbury being the single most potent influence on which death‐eligible cases will lead to a sentence of death), and that the C onnecticut death penalty system has not limited its application to the worst of the worst death‐eligible defendants. The work of an expert hired by the State of C onnecticut provided emphatic, independent confirmation of these three findings, and found that women who commit death‐eligible crimes are less likely than men to be sentenced to death. There is also strong and statistically significant evidence that minority defendants who kill whites are more likely to end up with capital sentences than comparable cases with white defendants. Regression estimates of the effect of both race and geography on death sentencing reveal the disparities can be glaring. Considering the most common type of death‐eligible murder—a multiple‐victim homicide—a white on white murder of average egregiousness outside W aterbury has a 0.57 percent chance of being sentenced to death, while a minority committing the identical crime on white victims in W aterbury would face a 91.2 percent likelihood. In other words, the minority defendant in W aterbury would be 160 times more likely to receive a sustained death sentence than the comparable white defendant in the rest of the state. Among the nine C onnecticut defendants to receive sustained death sentences over the study period, only M ichael R oss comports with the dictates that “within the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for ‘the worst of the worst.’ ” For the eight defendants on death row (after the 2005 execution of R oss), the median number of equally or more egregious death‐eligible cases that did not receive death sentences is between 35 and 46 (depending on the egregiousness measure). In light of the prospective abolition of the C onnecticut death penalty in A pril 2012, which eliminated the deterrence rationale for the death penalty, A tkins v. V irginia teaches that unless the C onnecticut death penalty regime “ measurably contributes to [the goal of retribution], it ‘is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,’ and hence an unconstitutional punishment.” Apart from R oss, the evidence suggests that the eight others residing on death row were not measurably more culpable than the many who were not capitally sentenced. Moreover, C onnecticut imposed sustained death sentences at a rate of 4.4 percent (9 of 205). This rate of death sentencing is among the lowest in the nation and more than two‐thirds lower than the 15 percent pre‐ Furman G eorgia rate that was deemed constitutionally problematic in that “freakishly rare” sentences of death are likely to be arbitrary.