In Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde argues that a liberal state has to be a justifiable state: state action can only be legitimate if it is publicly justified, that is, if it is based on accessible reasons. These accessible reasons, she argues, are reasons that can be understood by all citizens. She defends a purely epistemic conception of accessibility. On Laborde’s account, accessible reasons are identified by particular epistemic features, and not by their substantive content. In this paper, I argue that Laborde’s account of epistemic accessibility cannot deliver on its promise of public justification. To illustrate this argument, I examine the case of the prohibition of same-sex marriage and look at two potential reasons that could be used to justify this prohibition: the non-accessible reference to the Bible and the accessible appeal to the value of tradition.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Aurélia Bardon (2018) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 2 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: