This paper explores when, why, and how the chairmanship of international negotiation bodies allows the incumbent to influence bargaining outcomes – an area that so far has received limited systematic attention in scholarship on international cooperation. I present a theory of formal leadership that develops a rationalist argument for the delegation of authority to the chairmanship, the power resources of negotiation chairs, and the influence of formal leaders over outcomes. I test this theory in the context of European Union (EU) negotiations, summarizing the results of a book-length study. The historical evidence shows that the powers of the rotating EU Presidency have evolved in response to functional demands in European cooperation. Furthermore, carefully selected case studies demonstrate that the Presidency constitutes a power platform in EU politics, permitting governments at the helm to influence both the efficiency and the distributional implications of negotiations. Finally, I review the experiences of formal leadership in negotiations on trade, security, and the environment, establishing that the influence of negotiation chairs in the EU is not an isolated occurrence, but the expression of a general phenomenon in world politics. I conclude the paper by outlining its implications for ongoing debates on international cooperation, and by charting a course of further research on formal leadership.
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Jonas Tallberg (2010) studied this question.