A Critical Review of Committed Compliance

The dictionary defines compliance as act or process of complying to a desire, demand, proposal, or regimen (Merriam-Webster, Retrieved from http:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary). This definition, although broad in scope, does not take into account the fact that there are qualitative differences in compliant acts. One such difference has been highlighted in a widely cited series of studies of young children by Grazyna Kochanska and her colleagues. Specifically, Kochanska (Kochanska & Aksan, 1995; Kochanska, Aksan, & Koenig, 1995) has distinguished between acts that are performed either willingly or unwillingly in response to a caregiver's directives (requests, commands, or prohibitions). Compliant acts falling into the former category are labeled as committed compliance and those falling into the latter category are labeled as situational compliance. In operational terms, if the child complies with the caregiver's directive without having been reminded or prompted, the compliant act is coded as an instance of committed compliance, but if the child complies with the caregiver's directive only after having been reminded or prompted, the compliant act is coded as an instance of situational compliance. One may note that the term committed compliance carries considerable surplus meaning. Indeed, Kochanska (Kochanska & Aksan, 1995; Kochanska, Aksan, & Koenig, 1995) has argued that committed compliance signifies that the child feels an internal obligation to obey the caregiver's directives, and that committed compliance represents a first step in the development of the conscience. As committed compliance has been observed in children as young as 14 months of age (Kochanska, Coy, & Murray, 2001), it is thus Kochanska's claim that the conscience emerges during the infancy period. In sharp contrast, previous theorists, notably Freud, Durkheim, Mead, and Erikson (see Hogan & Emler, 1995), traced the beginnings of the conscience to the preschool period or later. If for no other reason, the boldness of Kochanska's claim that conscience emerges during infancy warrants close scrutiny. To this end, the present review was undertaken, with its primary goal being to evaluate the empirical status of two subsidiary claims made by Kochanska (see Kochanska & Aksan, 2006): (a) committed compliance is a trait-like quality and thus is longitudinally stable and cross-situationally consistent and (b) committed compliance is predictive of morality broadly defined. It should be noted that the bulk of the research reviewed below is Kochanska's work product. This does not mean that committed compliance has not been of interest to other investigators; rather, it probably reflects the fact that other investigators have lacked the resources to recruit large samples and then code compliance in the manner of Kochanska. To set the stage for the present review, it is important to note that Kochanska and others have assessed committed compliance in two contexts. In the first, the child is directed to perform an action, such as cleaning up toys. In the second, the child is directed not to perform an action, such as touching or playing with toys. Henceforth, committed compliance as assessed in these two contexts will be called do committed compliance and don't committed compliance, respectively. As will be seen, do and don't' committed compliance are not closely associated with one another, and therefore the only evidence examined here is with respect to the two forms of committed compliance considered separately. Evidence Relative to the Claim that Committed Compliance Is Trait-Like Longitudinal Stability of Committed Compliance Longitudinal stability refers to rank-order stability, that is, the degree to which individuals maintain their rank relative to their peers on a given variable over a given period of time. Only two studies have provided data regarding the longitudinal stability of do and don't committed compliance. …