Social Trust and the Ethics of Immigration Policy*

ALTHOUGH popular political discourse typically assumes that a state’s rightto guard borders and exclude foreigners is non-problematic, this privilege has been widely challenged.1 Because there is always a presumption against restricting the freedom of individuals, the burden is on those who would restrict movement to demonstrate that such limitations are justified. Although we might still end up with a very restrictive regime, such restrictions require justification. As a result, although most public debate asks what policy will be best for current citizens,2 a prior question regarding the shape and source of the state’s right to exclude foreigners must be settled before this question can be rightfully addressed. Concerns regarding social trust are often thought to provide this justification and thus legitimate limited restrictions on immigration. Indeed, it is commonly argued that immigration restrictions are justified because a nationally unified community is a necessary prerequisite of various redistributive programs (themselves required by justice).3 On this view, to the extent that immigration threatens a community’s enabling unity, it may be legitimately restricted.4 Many influential analysts endorse such a view: *I am grateful for the help I have received from participants in UVA’s graduate student theory