The moral relativism of writers like Benedict and Herskovits was mistaken to the extent that it denied the legitimacy of ever disapproving the actions and institutions of others, yet it should not be rejected entirely. No moral theory has yet emerged that provides the theoretical basis for making cross-cultural value judgments and that enjoys widespread acceptance; hence the paradox of ethical relativism: we can't live with it, but it isn't clear how to avoid it. Consequently, the tolerance that relativism called for should constitute our default mode of thought; it should govern our moral position in the absence of persuasive arguments to the contrary. The skepticism that was central to Boasian relativism also has a place, for we should be severely critical about making moral judgments, more so than some anthropologists have been. Finally, Boasian relativism was associated with a Copernican shift in the Western worldview, and this remains a crucial legacy.
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Elvin Hatch (1997) studied this question.
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