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In this paper we argue that autobiographical memory can be conceptualized as a mental state resulting from the interplay of a set of psychological capacities—self-reflection, self-agency, self-ownership and personal temporality—that transform a memorial representation into an autobiographical personal experience. We first review evidence from a variety of clinical domains—for example, amnesia, autism, frontal lobe pathology, schizophrenia—showing that breakdowns in any of the proposed components can produce impairments in autobiographical recollection, and conclude that the self-reflection, agency, ownership, and personal temporality are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for autobiographical memorial experience. We then suggest a taxonomy of amnesic disorders derived from consideration of the consequences of breakdown in each of the individual component processes that contribute to the experience of autobiographical recollection.
Klein et al. (Fri,) studied this question.