Conspiracy Theories as Natural Reactions to Power Asymmetry

Abstract This paper explores conspiracy theories (CTs) as natural psychological reactions to perceived power asymmetries rather than primarily as pathological errors of reasoning. Drawing on cognitive psychology, it argues that CTs arise from evolved mental mechanisms – such as hypersensitive agency detection, fundamental attribution error, and a Manichean worldview – that may have helped humans detect threats and maintain group cohesion. Rather than treating conspiracy thinking simply as irrationality or pathology, the paper interprets it as a recurrent response to perceived danger and loss of control, especially in situations where powerful actors are seen as opaque, threatening, or unaccountable. This perspective offers a unifying conceptual framework for understanding many cognitive, social, and political correlates of conspiracy thinking. While the paper focuses on CTs specifically, it distinguishes them from conspiracy beliefs (CBs), understood as psychological tendencies to interpret events in conspiratorial terms. The paper concludes that, because conspiracy thinking reflects widespread cognitive predispositions, it is unlikely to be eradicated, but it may be moderated through education, transparency, and the cultivation of analytical reasoning. This approach avoids pathologizing believers while acknowledging both the dangers and the persistence of conspiratorial thinking in modern societies.