The article draws on Randall Collins' interpretation of a Weberian sociology of legitimacy and the importance of geostrategy in explaining the contrasts between the creation and dissolution of Yugoslavia. The creation of Yugoslavia is interpreted as the outcome of the expansionist policy of the Serbian elite which was justified by the inclusion of all the ethnic Serbs into one state and made possible by the geostrategically weak positions of the Croatian and Slovenian elites. Different starting positions and motivations for unification led to a struggle among elites over the definition of the newly united state, particularly over the centralization–federalisation issue. The situation of communist Yugoslavia was a different one – the country was balancing between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. This balance – which, along with the memories of the ‘liberation struggle’, was the main source of the legitimacy of the regime – was destroyed with the cessation of the cold war. The newly created situation had two important results. First, the potential threat from the communist east had disappeared. Second, Slovenia and Croatia were attracted to the idea of integration into western Europe. This situation was substantially different than in the period of the creation of the Yugoslav state, in which western Europe was perceived as a potential threat to the existence of Croatia and Slovenia. Now, the perception of threat came from the east – from the ‘unreformed’ Serbia. The attraction to the west was much weaker in Serbia, where the old communist power structure stayed intact. The new situation, and the political elites' perception of it, created the tension which finally destroyed the basis of the multinational state.
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Duško Sekulić (1997) studied this question.