Adapts cognitive practices to explore reading and writing in natural philosophy, highlighting implications for understanding historical cognition.
With this paper I endeavour to adapt Lorraine Daston's term of cognitive practices in order to deal with material traces of writing and reading in natural philosophy of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century. In this paper I put particular emphasis on text-depiction-pairs. I hypothesize that basic cognitive faculties such as writing and reading serve as 'triggers' for cognitive practices of the scientific self: arts of memory, economies of attention, and the solidification and erosion of belief. For instance, the cognitive practices which are activated by 'reading' text-depiction-pairs are equivalent to the ones of the experimenter, who shifts his attention from observation to data to hypothesis and back. Building on Daston's well-known theory I focus on experimental cognition in specific epistemic situations.
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Jens Loescher (2014) studied this question.
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