QUOIN: Incentive Mechanisms for Crowd Sensing Networks

Crowd sensing networks play a critical role in big data generation where a large number of mobile devices collect various kinds of data with large-volume features. Although which information should be collected is essential for the success of crowd-sensing applications, few research efforts have been made so far. On the other hand, an efficient incentive mechanism is required to encourage all crowd-sensing participants, including data collectors, service providers, and service consumers, to join the networks. In this article, we propose a new incentive mechanism called QUOIN, which simultaneously ensures Quality and Usability Of INformation for crowd-sensing application requirements. We apply a Stackelberg game model to the proposed mechanism to guarantee each participant achieves a satisfactory level of profits. Performance of QUOIN is evaluated with a case study, and experimental results demonstrate that it is efficient and effective in collecting valuable information for crowd-sensing applications.