Beyond Integration Theory: The (Anti‐)Constitutional Dimension of European Crisis Governance

Abstract Political science analyses of the governance of the euro crisis largely build on conventional theories of European integration to account for the extent to which institutional developments either reflect supranationalism, inter‐governmentalism or historical path‐dependencies. This analytical focus captures the usual integration dynamics and institutional design outcomes, but overlooks the constitutional dimension of how the crisis affects the EU's legal order. In this agenda‐setting article, I draw attention to legal scholarship that highlights important deviations from the EU's ‘legal normalcy’. Legal studies find that a number of emergency measures were taken on an extra‐legal basis and through quasi‐autocratic procedures. Normative reconstructions interpret this practice as a form of transnational state of exception which transitions into permanent traits of authoritarianism in the EU's legal order. I argue that their findings offer a new terrain for political science research which transcends the explanatory categories of integration theory.