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Evolutionary game analysis demonstrates bidding behavior in power generation groups, indicating market entry timing for gas power generation.
As the double carbon target continues to be promoted and the installed capacity of gas-fired power generation gradually expands, whether and when gas-fired power generation should enter the market is a major concern for the industry. This paper analyzes the change in power generation cost and the characteristics of bidding behavior of the power generation group with the fluctuation of primary energy price to study the timing and role of gas power generation entering the market. The evolutionary game model for gas- and coal-fired power generation groups based on the influence of multiple factors takes into account factors such as generation costs, the number of power generation groups, generation capacity, supply, and demand. The equilibrium states of the power generation groups under various scenarios and the conditions that need to be satisfied for the equilibrium states are analyzed, and a method for determining the stable equilibrium point of the evolving market game is proposed. Examples use the actual price fluctuations of coal and natural gas as input data to validate the rationality of the paper’s model and the stable equilibrium approach.
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Jiang et al. (2022) studied this question.
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