The development of contractual norms in bargaining: replication and variation

Although a great deal of research has been done during the past decade and a half on the processes associated with conforming to norms (e.g., Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Hollander, 1960; and Jones, Jones, and Gergen, 1963), very little work has been done on the prior processes through which the norms come into existence. In understanding these processes and conditions which produce norms it may be useful to begin by inquiring into the ways in which norms provide adaptive solutions or functional advantages that are superior to other forms of social control. Such a functional approach has been suggested by Thibaut and Kelley (1959, pp. 130-42) in discussing the consequences of substituting normative control for control by interpersonal power. For example, in the A-B (dyadic) relationship, suppose A is in the act of exercising power over B. The substitution of normative control for the use of raw power may be advantageous to A as it enables him to regularize and stabilize his control over B. At the same time, the substitution reduces A's costs of surveillance and eliminates the ostentation of his power usage. The advantages to B of this substitution are less apparent but