The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over Aid to the Nicaraguan "Contras"

This study analyzes voting patterns in the House of Representatives on aid to the Nicaraguan contras during the 98th, 99th, and 100th Congresses, in order to examine three theoretical issues: the importance of ideology as a determinant of congressional voting behavior, the relative importance of conversion and member replacement in explaining congressional policy shifts, and the impact of changes in contextual factors on members' voting decisions. As in many recent studies of defense and foreign policy issues, the member's ideology proved to be the predominant factor in explaining contra aid votes. Party and region were also significant, but the constituency's ideology and the electoral vulnerability of members were not. Though membership replacement was a key factor in the shifting balance between the pro-contra and anti-contra blocs, replacement alone was not sufficient to explain changes in the House majority. Conversion was equally important and proved to be a function of President Reagan's standing in the polls and of events in central America that altered the political atmosphere of the debate. Public opinion on the contra aid issue and the content of aid proposals showed no effect. The war in Vietnam shattered the bipartisan consensus that had supported U.S. foreign policy since World War II, inaugurating a period of renewed congressional activism (Franck and Weisband 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1984; Crabb and Holt 1988). During Ronald Reagan's presidency, no issue better exemplified the tension between Congress and the executive than did policy toward Nicaragua. Convinced that vital U.S. security interests were at stake, President Reagan was determined to aid so-called contra rebels in their bid to overthrow the Sandinista government. Liberal Democrats, especially in the House of Representatives, were determined to stop the war. The debate over Nicaragua helped define a new balance of power between Congress and the executive branch in foreign policy. Over seven years, neither side in that debate was able to win a definitive victory. To opponents of contra aid, it seemed that, no matter how many times they voted the program down, it always managed