Why are armed conflicts involving warring parties with an Islamist agenda more difficult to resolve through negotiations? In previous research, two main explanations have been put forward; one that highlight the religious element of the parties’ conflict issue and one that emphasis the organizational character of these conflicts, in particular their transnational nature. Yet we still do not know which of these explanations that carry the most explanatory power. The purpose of this article is to test the empirical relevance of these theories through an in-depth study of five negotiation attempts between the government of Nigeria and the group known as Boko Haram during the time period 2011 to 2016. By doing so, this article both addresses one of the key theoretical debates in the scholarly field of religious conflicts and conflict resolution, and presents novel empirical material on a case not well covered in previous negotiation literature.
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Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs (2020) studied this question.
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