Appraisals are direct, immediate, intuitive, and unwitting…and some are reflective…

In 1960, Magda Arnold defined the appraisal construct as being causal to emotion. Appraisal, according to her, refers to a direct, immediate, and intuitive process that does not initially require recognition of the object that is being appraised. It is based on phylogenetically ancient subcortical brain structures. In addition, Arnold proposed the existence of a related conscious process, also referred to as appraisal, that interacts with the direct appraisal and is responsible for a differentiation of emotional states. This theory was revolutionary and is still to be considered modern because it already comprised much of what is currently hypothesised to be causal for emotion. However, Lazarus, who initially believed that conscious aspects of appraisal are more important than implicit and unaware appraisals, coined the term cognitive appraisals and popularised this notion widely. In opposition to what he perceived as a prevailing emphasis on higher cognitive processes in emotion theory, Zajonc (1980 Zajonc, R. B. 1980. Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, 39: 151–75. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) argued that emotion elicitation does not depend on conscious cognition. I argue that Arnold's theory is in fact completely consistent with Zajonc's view and data. The concept of appraisal should be discussed in relation to Arnold's original intention, because it provides not only the basis of an integrated view of multiple levels of emotional processing, encompassing views espoused by Zajonc and by Lazarus, but may guide current and future research on multiple levels of processing in the elicitation of emotions.