An INS Monitor to Detect GNSS Spoofers Capable of Tracking Vehicle Position

In this paper, we describe and evaluate a new monitor that uses inertial navigation system (INS) measurements to detect spoofing attacks on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers. Spoofing detection is accomplished by monitoring the Kalman filter innovations in a tightly coupled INS/GNSS mechanization. Monitor performance is evaluated against worst case spoofing attacks, including spoofers capable of tracking vehicle position. There are two main contributions of this paper. The first is a mathematical framework to quantify postmonitor spoofing integrity risk. The second is an analytical expression of the worst case sequence of spoofed GNSS signals. We then apply these to an example spoofing attack on a Boeing 747 on final approach. The results show that GNSS spoofing is easily detected, with high integrity, unless the spoofer's position-tracking devices have unrealistic, near-perfect accuracy, and no delays.