Depersonalization and intent

A 38-year-old man charged with unlawfully causing grievous bodily Warm to his wife with intent to do her grievous bodily harm pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm but denied that there was any intent to cause grievous bodily harm. In his evidence the defendant said that he seemed to be like an observer, he could not influence what he was doing and it was like watching himself hitting himself. Medical evidence called in his defence was to the effect that he was in a state of severe depersonalization and was not able to form a specific intent to cause his wife serious harm. Medical evidence called by the Crown was to the effect that dcpersonalization is a disorder not of doing or volition but of the perception of doing or volition and a depersonalized intent is nevertheless an intent. The defendant was convicted by a majority jury of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do so. The psychopadiology of depersonalization is discussed and similarities are drawn between this case and cases involving hysterical dissociation where it has been held that the relevant defences are insanity and automatism.