The New Role of the ECB as the Fiscal Agent of the European Commission

ABSTRACT The growing importance of European Union (EU) debt in recent years has led to significant institutional changes. Since 2020, the European Commission has taken on the role of managing the Union’s debt, while the European Central Bank (ECB) has begun providing ‘fiscal agent’ services in support of this function. Specifically, the ECB holds the Commission’s bank account for borrowing operations and acts as ‘paying agent’ for the securities issued, according to arrangements that may extend to future EU borrowing instruments. While article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank allows central banks to act as ‘fiscal agents’ for public entities, this statutory task of the ECB has received little attention in legal scholarship. Traditionally, these functions have been performed by national central banks on behalf of their respective governments. The ECB’s assumption of this role marks a departure from established practice within the Union and raises important legal and institutional questions. The article examines the nature and scope of the fiscal agent services, their implications for ECB independence and liability, and the nature of the ECB’s relationship with the Commission and other institutions, such as the European Court of Auditors. In this way, the research contributes to the debate on the EU fiscal capacity and EU institutional balance.