John Locke and Henry More on personal identity

Locke’s theory of personal identity in Essay 2.27 notably resonates with the account of personal “Ipseity” developed by Henry More in The Immortality of the Soul as a critique of Averroism. Like Locke, More established a connection between personal identity, consciousness, and memory, emphasising the crucial role of consciousness in unifying an individual’s mental life. However, More equated consciousness with an attribute of the soul, thereby making the continuity of personal identity over time dependent on the persistence of the soul’s immaterial substance. He further characterised the sameness of this substance as sufficient to ensure human identity, thus conflating personal identity, human identity, and substance identity. Although Locke did not reference More directly, his arguments in the Essay indicate his intention to challenge More’s substance-based account of personal identity. Additionally, Locke sought to expose the inconsistencies in More’s defence of the pre-existence of the soul, one of the pillars of his rational theology. Locke contended that this doctrine could not adequately vindicate divine justice and benevolence, as it failed to guarantee the continuity of personal identity in this life. Consequently, it could not provide an effective alternative to the traditional doctrine of original sin, contrary to More’s beliefs.