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This study explores the impact of government subsidy on blockchain traceability leadership (manufacturer vs. retailer) in a technology-supported supply chain including a manufacturer, a retailer, and a technical service firm. Methodology: We built Stackelberg game models for different scenarios (non-blockchain, manufacturer/retailer-led blockchain, and subsidized blockchain) to derive equilibria. Results: First, blockchain adoption is not always optimal unless consumers exhibit low acceptance of non-blockchain products and construction costs are low. Second, a party (manufacturer/retailer) tends to lead blockchain construction if the technical service firm shares more of its costs than the other party. Finally, government subsidies benefit the manufacturer and the retailer, but the technical service firm does not always benefit from subsidies. With suitable rates and lower costs, the manufacturer or the retailer prefers to lead the construction, potentially creating a win–win scenario in the supply chain. Novelty: We quantified leadership-switching conditions via the technical service firm’s cost sharing and took its decision-making licensing fees into account, addressing gaps in multi-stakeholder blockchain adoption research.
Pu et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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