Information, Perception, and Action: What Should Ecological Psychologists Learn From Milner and Goodale (1995)?

Abstract Two issues motivated the reassessment of a core concept of ecological psychology: the relation between perception and action. The first was Milner and Goodale's (1995) claim, based on neurological and behavioral evidence, that vision for perception is distinct from vision for action. The second was the apparent involvement of lower order, nonspecific optical variables in the control of action as reported by Michaels, Zeinstra, and Oudejans (in press). Perception in the usual ecological sense of the detection of information is obviously needed for action; however, to the extent that perception is defined in terms of explicit knowledge or awareness of environmental properties, including animal-referential ones, a separation was deemed justified. Perception, so construed, together with the ventral stream, was suggested to be about telling rather than acting.