How do authoritarian regimes benefit from civil society organizations’ expertise and capacity while mitigating the potential risks they pose? Using machine learning and interrupted time series modeling of an original custom-annotated dataset of all historical NGO registrations in China, we find that NGO policy is unevenly implemented. This unevenness, however, is not random. China uses NGO registration policies to facilitate local risk utility tradeoffs in line with threat perceptions and governance needs. This, we argue, is a form of lawfare—using legal means to achieve political or repressive ends. Examining a 2013 policy shift, we find local governments relax sponsorship requirements more in policy domains with low state capacity and less where civil society poses a threat, tailoring national mandates to shape local conditions. We show how lawfare is a complex instrument providing local flexibility in repression and cooptation of civil society, under the guise of routine legal and administrative procedures.
Hildebrandt et al. (Fri,) studied this question.