This monograph examines constitutional limits on the use of probabilistic methods in decision-making, indicating implications for governance.
This monograph examines the constitutional and legal limits upon the use of probabilistic methods in governmental decision-making. The work argues that probability, whether generated through human expertise, actuarial systems, statistical models, machine learning, or artificial intelligence, is fundamentally a mechanism for acquiring knowledge rather than exercising sovereign authority. Drawing upon Australian administrative law, evidence law, procedural fairness, judicial review, and emerging approaches to automated decision-making, the work develops a jurisprudence of probability that distinguishes probabilistic inference from legal facts and lawful authority. The publication proposes the RSQS Law-KC framework as a structured model for the governance of probabilistic systems within public administration. The framework establishes boundaries between information acquisition, probabilistic analysis, evidence formation, statutory discretion, and the exercise of sovereign power. Artificial intelligence is treated not as a separate legal category but as a contemporary implementation technology that increases the scale and speed of probabilistic analysis. The central thesis advanced is that governments may employ probabilistic systems to collect, analyse, and prioritise information, but may not automatically equate probabilistic outputs with evidence, legal facts, or lawful authority. The work contributes to the developing fields of algorithmic governance, legal informatics, administrative law, and constitutional theory.
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Gregory Adamson (2026) studied this question.
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