Deterrence by proxy under denial: conditions for failure in Iran’s extended deterrence 2023–2025

This study investigates Iran’s strategic posture following the 7 October 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel. It argues that the aftermath exposed limitations in Iran’s deterrence-by-proxy doctrine, which relies on non-state actors like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis to project power while maintaining plausible deniability. Drawing on deterrence theory and asymmetric warfare literature, this study examines Iran’s restrained response to the Israeli counteroffensive across five fronts: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, direct military confrontation with Israel, and Iran’s political reputation. Using a qualitative case study approach with process tracing and content analysis, the findings suggest Iran’s regional strategy will face unprecedented degradation in 2023–2025. The collapse of the Assad regime, loss of Hezbollah’s leadership, and strikes on Iranian soil marked a turning point in Iran’s leadership of the ‘Axis of Resistance’. This study concludes that Iran must recalibrate its foreign policy to account for diminished deterrence credibility and evolving high-tech warfare dynamics in the Middle East, with potential trajectories including accelerated nuclear development, deeper Eurasian alignment, or adoption of a more constrained asymmetric posture.