Antecedents and Consequences of Participative Budgeting: Evidence on the Effects of Asymmetrical Information.

A review of empirical studies on participative budgeting indicates that most have focused on its consequences (e.g., attitude, motivation, performance, satisfaction) rather than its antecedents. We suggest that the mixed results of participative budgeting research are due to incomplete models of the process. Further, we propose that researchers develop theories that tie particular antecedents of participative budgeting to specific consequences. Next, we develop a model that uses information asymmetry between local and central management as the antecedent condition and link it to: (1) participation of local managers in setting their budgets, (2) budget-based incentives and (3) firm-wide performance. Data to test these relationships were gathered from corporate controllers of the Standard and Poor's 500, and the relationships were tested using path analysis. Three of the four hypotheses were supported—the effects of information asymmetry on participative budgeting, participative budgeting on budget-based incentives and the effect of budget-based incentives on firm-wide performance. The fourth hypothesis-the effects of information asymmetry on budget-based incentives was only marginally supported. We also propose three other possible antecedents of participative budgeting that can be investigated: (1) a desire to positively influence individual attitudes, behavior and performance, (2) to reinforce a particular culture, and (3) to provide a mechanism tor organizational learning.