Between engagement and proscription: the British State’s dilemma in dealing with Sinn Féin, 1981–90

The rise of Sinn Féin as an electoral force in Northern Ireland after 1981 presented the British government with a fundamental dilemma: How should it deal with a political party that was closely associated with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), and which expressed open support for political violence? Should Sinn Féin be treated as a party like any other, or should it be isolated—and potentially proscribed—because of its links to ‘armed struggle’? At stake were wider issues about the functioning of political legitimacy, engagement, and exclusion in a democratic system amidst ongoing conflict. Drawing on internal government debates and policy discussions, this article explores the way in which the governments of Margaret Thatcher confronted these dilemmas in practice. It argues that, despite the Prime Minister’s uncompromising public rhetoric and own ideological preferences, British policy towards Sinn Féin was shaped by a pragmatic calculus developed by ministers and senior civil servants. In doing so, this article reinforces recent historiographical interpretations of the Thatcher era that question the rigidity of ‘Thatcherism’ as an applied political doctrine and the importance of institutional and administrative dynamics in the making of policy.