Analysis examines non-reductive functionalism's implications on qualia and causal relevance, suggesting flaws in existing arguments.
Non-reductive functionalism holds that qualia are distinct, non-physical properties that are caused by functional properties. This view violates the plausible principles that (i) mere dispositional properties lack independent causal relevance, and (ii) convention-dependent properties lack causal relevance. David Chalmers’ main arguments for the view rest on his dancing qualia and fading qualia thought experiments. But in each argument, at least one of two premises is implausible, depending on whether we take qualia to be epiphenomenal or not.
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Michael Huemer (2026) studied this question.
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