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Demonstrates false data injection detection in PV inverters, suggesting a robust defense mechanism.
The widespread deployment of photovoltaic (PV) inverters with digital control and communication systems has increased the power grid’s attack surface, making it more vulnerable to cyberattacks. This creates a need for locally implementable attack-detection methods that do not disrupt inverter operation. This paper therefore proposes an irradiance-driven natural watermarking approach for decentralized detection of false data injection (FDI) attacks on inverter terminal measurements. The approach leverages irradiance-driven DC-link voltage variations to watermark the inverter outputs, generating a non-removable signature in the true measurements. The proposed method is evaluated using a real-time hardware-in-the-loop model of a three-phase grid-following PV inverter that captures PV-array and grid-connection dynamics. Implementation robustness is further assessed on a separate hardware grid-forming inverter testbed with non-idealized components. In the tested cases, the detection model identifies noise-injection and replay attacks within 15ms, while otherwise undetectable model-based attacks are revealed when DC-link voltage variations between 5% and 10% occur. These experimental results demonstrate that irradiance-driven natural watermarking can reveal FDI attacks without affecting normal inverter operation.
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Bjorndal et al. (2026) studied this question.
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