Mendelow On Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties

According to Russellian monism, there are non-structural properties that both underlie physical, structural properties and help constitute, and thus necessitate, phenomenal properties (Alter and Pereboom Citation2023). Derk Pereboom (Citation2011, Citation2014, Citation2015, Citation2019) characterizes the relevant non-structural properties as absolutely intrinsic properties, where ‘P is an absolutely intrinsic property of X just in case P is an intrinsic property of X and P is not grounded in extrinsic properties of either X or parts of X’ (Pereboom Citation2019: 184). Justin Mendelow (Citation2024) argues that Pereboom’s characterization is inadequate because it implies that non-structural properties do not necessitate phenomenal properties, either alone or in combination with structural properties. We argue that Mendelow’s argument rests on premises that Pereboom can reasonably reject.