This paper introduces the Human Capital Ratio (HCR) — a fiscal policy mechanism designed to address the accelerating displacement of human labor by artificial intelligence systems in the enterprise economy. Modeled on the Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) in healthcare and the non-discrimination testing principles of 401(k) retirement law, HCR establishes a dual trigger structure: a spend-based trigger that fires when human-directed spend falls below a defined ratio of AI-directed spend, and a non-discrimination trigger that fires when compensation becomes skewed toward highly compensated employees at the expense of rank and file workers, regardless of the aggregate spend ratio. The framework defines qualifying AI spend through a three-layer taxonomy, assigns obligations through a chain-of-custody model covering contractors, gig platforms, open source deployments, and bundled enterprise software, and embeds a self-auditing mechanism using existing investor disclosure requirements. A forward-looking efficiency disclosure requirement closes the primary avoidance vector the ratio mechanism alone cannot address, requiring organizations to file projected operational cost reductions at the point of AI capital commitment and reconcile those projections against actual outcomes in subsequent annual filings. Levy proceeds flow into a pooled national fund that provides a cost-of-living-indexed social minimum income to displaced workers. Benefit eligibility is anchored to the levy trigger rather than to documented termination reasons, with a 24-month look-back window and a constructive dismissal standard that close the primary workforce manipulation vectors. The fund is governed by a dynamic adjustment mechanism that maintains structural surplus and allocates excess collections to workforce retraining. Where AI adoption raises compensation equitably across the workforce and human-directed spend remains proportional to AI spend, neither trigger fires — the intended signal that the framework's objectives have been met. The framework's equitable operation depends in part on competitive market structure among AI model makers; where pricing power concentrates at the development end, complementary competition policy is necessary.
Nandeep Nagarkar (Wed,) studied this question.