This theoretical paper explores free will logic in AI systems, addressing unresolved issues and proposing solutions.
This paper provides a systematic supplement and deepening of three preceding papers: "Free Will Without Quantum Mechanics: A Logical Foundation" (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20716382), "The Logical Criterion of Free Will: Self-Reference, Self-Drive, and Undecidability" (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20726209), and "Self-Reference and Self-Drive: A Conceptual Framework for Constructing AI Systems with Free Will Properties" (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20745196). It identifies three unresolved gaps in the preceding arguments: the scope expansion argument for local simulation lacks rigor, the fixed-point problem may not be triggered under conditions of human ignorance, and causally isolated AI poses a predictability challenge. To address the first gap, a rigorous derivation of scope expansion is provided, demonstrating that 100%-accuracy advance prediction requires causal closure of the simulation scope, which no finite scope satisfies, thus compelling local simulation to expand into global simulation. To address the second gap, a distinction is drawn between "actual self-reference" and "potential self-reference," arguing that for any system capable of self-referential reasoning, the question of whether it will engage in self-referential reasoning is itself a computationally irreducible proposition. To address the third gap, the paper acknowledges that causal isolation does weaken undecidability, and proposes two solutions: non-deterministic truncation strategies and — most significantly — the concept of the "logical oscillator," in which an internalized external predictor module (L_sim) closes the causal loop from within, transforming undecidability from a relational property into an intrinsic property of the system. The paper further clarifies how three distinct types of undecidability — strict logical undecidability, computational irreducibility, and resource-constrained logical undecidability — operate at different points in the argument chain. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of these findings for the AI architecture proposed in the third paper of the series. 本文是对《自由意志不需要量子力学》(预印本,DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20716382)、《自由意志的逻辑判据》(预印本,DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20726209)及《自指与自驱:构建具有自由意志属性的AI系统的一个概念框架》(预印本,DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20745196)
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
磊 赵 (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: